Revolta muncitorilor de la Atelierele Grivita (1933)

Revolta muncitorilor de la Atelierele Grivita (1933)

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Tensiunile sociale provocate de efectele marii crize eonomice mondiale ajung la apogeu in Romania la inceputul anului 1933. „Curbele de sacrificiu“ au fost resimtite in special de muncitorii ceferisti si petrolisti. Ei s-au adresat Guvernului national-taranist pentru imbunatatirea nivelului de trai, insa fara mari rezultate.
In cursul anului 1932, Guvernul roman a luat o serie de masuri nepopulare pentru a face fata marii crize economice. „Curbele de sacrificiu“, care au afectat in prima faza doar pe functionari, au atins si categoria muncitorilor la sfarsitul anului. Astfel ca intreprinderile industriale au suspendat indemnizatia de chirie si „alocatia de scumpete“, ceea ce a provocat reducerea salariilor muncitorilor cu aproximativ 25%.
EXPLOZIA SOCIALA. In ianuarie 1933, viata politica si sociala a Romaniei era tensionata la maximum. Iuliu Maniu tocmai plecase de la conducerea Guvernului national-taranist, provocand o criza politica insemnata. Noul prim-ministru, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, inca nu isi consolidase autoritatea suficient, mai ales ca trebuia sa faca fata introducerii unei noi „curbe de sacrificiu“. Peste toate acestea, iarna grea contribuia la inrautatirea conditiilor de trai. Primii care au reactionat au fost profesorii si studentii care cereau concesii economice din partea Guvernului. Greva acestora a incurajat protestul muncitorilor.
La Atelierele CFR Grivita din Bucuresti, dupa ultima „curba de sacrificiu“, muncitorii aveau un nou motiv de nemultumiri. La 20 ianuarie, administratia a anuntat ca plata salariilor se va face numai daca lucratorii vor prezenta dovada achitarii impozitelor pe ultimii trei ani. A doua zi s-a introdus o noua masura care a alimentat tensiunile, prin concedierea temporara a muncitorilor de la atelierele de vagoane. Acestia lucrau sub cerul liber, astfel ca, din cauza conditiilor meteorologice nefaste, conducerea a dispus inchiderea temporara a sectiei.
COMUNISTII EXPLOATEAZA NEMULTUMIRILE. La inceputul anului 1933, cel mai important nucleu comunist pare a fi la Atelierele CFR Grivita din Bucuresti. Aici, simpatizantii comunisti penetrasera organizatiile muncitoresti social-democrate, iar la sfarsitul anului 1932 reusisera se creeze un „sindicat rosu“. Acesta era condus de Panait Bogatoiu si Constantin Doncea, in vreme ce Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej coordona activitatea organizatiei din punct vedere al apartenentei la miscarea comunista. Prin curieri, Gheorghiu-Dej si Moscu Cohn (Gheorghe Stoica) mentineau legatura cu nucleele comuniste de la Atelierele de vagoane din Cluj si Iasi.
Liderii „sindicatului rosu“ aveau ca obiectiv sa creeze in fiecare sectie a Atelierelor nuclee comuniste care sa atraga muncitorii spre greva. O alta strategie a comunistilor era discreditarea sindicatelor social-democrate, prin sabotarea intrunirilor. Astfel ca Bogatoiu si Doncea aveau misiunea de a patrunde in salile de sedinta cu scopul de a obtine cuvantul la tribuna unde urmau sa militeze pentru declansarea grevei generale.
Aceste actiuni ale comunistilor romani se inscriau in directivele date de Comintern la congresul al saselea din iulie-august 1928. Stalin le-a impus comunistilor sa rupa orice legatura cu social-democratii, pe care-i considera „fascisti sociali“, si sa infiinteze „sindicate rosii“ pentru a concura organizatiile social-democrate.
SCANTEIA DE LA GRIVITA. Valul de greve de la inceputul anului 1933 a fost lansat de muncitorii de la Atelierele CFR Grivita, unde sindicatul comunist penetrase puternic sectiile de la atelierele de vagoane. Acolo, pe langa problemele legate de concedierile temporare, un motiv suplimentar de nemultumire mai era si faptul ca salariile erau mai mici decat la atelierele de locomotive. La 28 ianuarie, unul dintre liderii „sindicatului rosu“, Panait Bogatoiu, a dispus incetarea lucrului la atelierele de vagoane la ora 10.30. Acesta, in fruntea unui „comitet de fabrica“, a inaintat conducerii Atelierelor o lista de revendicari. Initial, miscarea cuprindea doar personalul de la vagoane, aproximativ 700, insa, la aflarea vestii, peste 3.000 de muncitori s-au asociat protestului.
Ministrul Comunicatiilor, Eduard Mirto, a intervenit in conflictul de munca dintre muncitori si Consiliul de Administratie al CFR. Acesta a dispus satisfacerea solicitarilor economice ale muncitorilor: acordarea unui salariu minim de 4.000 lei si reintroducerea alocatiei de chirie. Liderii sindicatului social-democrat s-au declarat multumiti de negocieri, iar ministerul a dat dispozitii ca majorarile sa se aplice incepand cu data de 1 ianuarie 1933.
In ciuda tratativelor dintre Guvern si sindicate, Atelierele CFR Grivita au ramas un focar de tensiuni sociale. Sindicalistii comunisti au raspandit in dimineata zilei de 2 februarie 1933 manifeste in cartierele de muncitori ceferisti. Prin acestea, ei isi aratau neincrederea fata de promisiunile Guvernului si cereau recunoasterea „comitetelor de fabrica“. Dupa inceperea programului de lucru, din cei 5.000 de angajati ai atelierelor, doar 200 au inceput munca. In scurt timp, acestia au fost determinati sa se opreasca, iar administratia a fost instiintata despre noile revendicari: acordarea „alocatiei de scumpete“, cresterea salariilor cu 40%, recunoasterea „comitetelor de fabrica“.
Cu toate ca atelierele au fost inconjurate de jandarmni si de armata, protestul nu a incetat. Sindicatele social-democrate, prin vocea presedintelui Dumitru Sparlea, s-au desolidarizat de noile revendicari. Autoritatile nu au dorit sa negocieze asupra noilor cereri, considerandu-le politice, in conditiile in care cele economice fusesera deja satisfacute in mare parte. Astfel ca grevistii si-au incetat protestul, mai ales ca sindicatele social-democrate au acuzat agitatiile comunistilor in miscarea muncitoreasca.

Dupa preluarea puterii de catre comunisti, grevele din februarie 1933 au intrat in mitologia regimului. Printre „eroii“ acelor evenimente a fost si Ilie Pintilie, care a coordonat sindicatele de la Atelierele CFR din Iasi, Cernauti si Pascani. El a intrat in contact cu sindicalistii comunisti de la CFR Grivita prin emisarii trimisi de Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. In fapt, conducatorul din umbra a fost Moscu Cohn, care in anii puterii comuniste s-a bucurat de un mare respect, fiind considerat initiatorul lui Dej intr-ale marxismului. Gheorghiu-Dej si Ilie Pintilie s-au reintalnit apoi la inchisoarea Doftana. Ilie Pintilie nu a fost asa de norocos ca fostul lider comunist, deoarece a murit strivit de zidurile inchisorii Doftana la cutremurul din noiembrie 1940.

La Atelierele CFR Grivita, sindicatul comunist avea putini aderenti, circa 400, in conditiile in care acolo lucrau 5.000 de muncitori. Nu toti membrii acestuia erau comunisti, fiind mai degraba atrasi de propaganda liderilor Panait Bogatoiu si Constantin Doncea. Acestia sustineau ca sindicatele social-democrate erau incapabile sa reprezinte interesele muncitorilor. Comunistii de la conducerea sindicatului au lansat ideea constituirii unor „comitete de fabrica“, dupa modelul sovietelor bolsevice din 1917.

dupa Ilarion Tiu

sursa: Jurnalul National

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3 COMMENTS

  1. 1.
    Mortii de la Grivita :

    The Party statutes of the Communist world, William B. Simons, Stephen White, 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, p.366:

    „In February 1933 a strike organized by RCP activists at the Grivita railyard (outside Bucharest) resulted in several dozen deaths and a couple of thousand arrests when goveerment troops moved in.”

    http://books.google.ca/books?id=NZHj2kjV_FgC&pg=PA366&lpg=PA366&dq=romania+1933+railyard+strike&source=bl&ots=Y4HPZjzLwI&sig=5QVRqhRNkvBwC9QUVFwW4BBgHTg&hl=fr&ei=ibv9TNjfD8SAlAe7pPHMCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=romania%201933%20railyard%20strike&f=false

    Peter Huebner in Arbeiter in Staatssozialismus aminteste, citand surse românesti recente 3 morti si 16 raniti grav imediat dupa atac. Pudoare mare cand e sa aflam cati din grav raniti au decedat.

    2.
    Sovietul ca si comitete de muncitori fara constinta de a fi atasati aripii bolsevice a Social-democratilor (citat din Orlando Figes, Istoria revolutiei):
    Revolutia reprimata din 1905:

    Alexander Pasternak, a twelve-year-old schoolboy and brother of the poet to be, was so disturbed by the shootings that he declared himself to be a ‘wholehearted revolutionary’ and marched with his friends through his AFFLUENT ST PETERSBURG NEIGHBOURHOOD SHOUTING, ‘WE ARE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS!’ Students across the country went on strike and turned their campuses into centres of political agitation. At Moscow University 3,000 students held a rally, at which they burned a portrait of the Tsar and hung red flags on the faculty buildings. By the end of February the government had been forced to close down virtually all the institutions of higher learning until the end of the academic year. EVEN THE THEOLOGICAL ACADEMIES WERE AFFECTED BY STUDENT DISORDERS.38
    Meanwhile, the zemstvo constitutionalists revived their campaign and at their Second National Congress in April called for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. Professional unions organized themselves at a national level into a Union of Unions to rally their members behind the liberal cause. The Unions of Writers, Lawyers, Professors and Engineers were the first such unions to be formed. They were later joined (despite the opposition of some reluctant males in the leadership of the Union of Unions) by a Women’s Union for Equality which campaigned for voting rights. Semi-professional groups, such as the Pharmaceutical Assistants, the Clerks and Book-keepers, and the Railway Workers and Employees, also established affiliated unions. Their participation in the Union of Unions gave the intelligentsia a direct link with the masses.* Hundreds of zemstvos, city councils and voluntary bodies sent petitions to the government demanding political reforms. The press publicized them and highlighted other grievances in a way that gave the public anger a single national voice. ‘We can no longer live like this,’ declared the headline of a leading liberal newspaper on 21 May, and soon everyone was repeating the phrase.39

    […]

    […] the general strike of 1905. For it was the classic example of a spontaneous yet disciplined uprising of the working class. It began on 20 September with a walk-out by the Moscow printers – the most educated group of workers – for better pay and conditions. The strikers made contact with the students and held a mass street demonstration, which was attacked by the police. The workers threw stones at the police, smashed shop windows, overturned benches and knocked down trees to make barricades. By the start of October the printers of St Petersburg and several other cities had come out in solidarity with their comrades: middle-class homes went without their newspapers for several weeks. Then the railway workers came out on strike. The Union of Railway Employees and Workers was affiliated to the Union of Unions, which had been discussing the idea of a general political strike to further its campaign for political reform since the summer. By 10 October virtually the entire railway network had come to a halt. Millions of other workers – factory, shop and transport workers, bank and office employees, hospital staff, students, lecturers, even the actors of the Imperial Theatre in St Petersburg – came out in support of what had become in effect a national strike against the autocracy. The cities were brought to a standstill. All transport stopped. The lights went out at night. Telegraphs and telephones ceased to work. Shops were closed and their windows boarded up. Food became scarce. Robberies and looting exploded out of control. The gentry and the bourgeoisie took fright at the breakdown of law and order. When the Moscow water system began to malfunction there was panic; rumours spread that the strikers had deliberately contaminated the water. Workers, students and professionals joined together in demonstrations against the authorities. Many ended in the hasty building of barricades and in violent clashes with the police and Cossacks. THE POLITICAL DEMANDS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE REMARKABLY UNIFORM – THE CONVOCATION OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE – WHICH WAS A SIGN OF THE CO-ORDINATING ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNION OF UNIONS AS WELL AS THE INCREASED DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKERS THEMSELVES.52

    ================================================

    Revolutia din februarie 1917 (care s-a soldat cu un legislativ dominat de social-democrati si un guvern de liberali, remaniat pana in octombrie de mai multe ori (de la un moment si social-democratii au intrat la guvernare) :

    Everything was focused on the Tauride Palace, seat of the Duma and citadel of democracy. By the early afternoon of the 27th a crowd of 25,000 people – many of them soldiers from the nearby Preobrazhensky and Volynsky barracks – had gathered in front of the palace. THEY WERE LOOKING FOR POLITICAL LEADERS. THE FIRST TO APPEAR WERE THE MENSHEVIKS KHRUSTALEV-NOSAR (CHAIRMAN OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET IN 1905), AND GVOZDEV AND BOGDANOV (LEADERS OF THE WORKERS’ GROUP), ESCORTED BY THE CROWD THAT HAD JUST RELEASED THEM FROM THE KRESTY JAIL. IN THE PALACE THEY MET CHKHEIDZE, SKOBELEV AND KERENSKY, AND THEN ANNOUNCED TO THE CROWDS OUTSIDE THAT A ‘PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS’ DEPUTIES’ HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THEY APPEALED TO THE WORKERS TO ELECT AND SEND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FIRST ASSEMBLY OF THE SOVIET SCHEDULED FOR THAT EVENING. The appeal was printed in a makeshift first issue of Izvestiia, the only newspaper to appear that day, and widely circulated in the streets.
    DESPITE ITS NAME, THERE WERE VERY FEW WORKERS AMONG THE FIFTY VOTING DELEGATES AND 200 OBSERVERS PACKED INTO THE SMOKE-FILLED ROOM 12 OF THE TAURIDE PALACE FOR THAT FIRST CHAOTIC SESSION OF THE SOVIET. MOST OF THE WORKERS WERE STILL ON THE STREETS AND WERE EITHER DRUNK OR COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF THE SOVIET’S EXISTENCE. THEIR VOTING PLACES WERE LARGELY OCCUPIED BY SOCIALIST INTELLECTUALS. Sokolov assumed the preliminary chairmanship of the meeting, which immediately proceeded to set up an Executive Committee of 6 Mensheviks, 2 Bolsheviks, 2 SRs and 5 non-party intellectuals. It was not so much a democratic body as a self-appointed one made up of the various socialist factions and then superimposed on the Soviet. The next day, as 600 Soviet deputies were elected by the workers and soldiers of Petrograd, two more representatives from each of the major socialist parties – the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, the SRs, the Bund, the Mensheviks, the Inter-District group* and the Bolsheviks – were added to the Executive Committee. THE EFFECT WAS TO STRENGTHEN ITS RIGHT WING, THOSE WHO WERE MOST OPPOSED TO TAKING POWER. THE VOICE OF THE WORKERS, WHO MIGHT WELL HAVE DEMANDED THAT THEY DID TAKE POWER, WAS NOT HEARD. THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE FACTORY DELEGATE ON THE SOVIET EXECUTIVE – AND THAT IN A BODY CLAIMING TO REPRESENT THE WORKING CLASS.

    […]

    Finally, the Soviet leaders were not even certain of their own authority over the masses in the streets. They had been shocked by the violence and the hatred, the anarchic looting and the vandalism displayed by the crowds in the February Days. They were afraid that if they assumed power, that if they themselves became ‘the government’, all this uncontrolled anger might be redirected against them. Mstislavsky claimed that ‘from the first hours of the revolution’ the vast majority of the Soviet leaders were united with the members of the Temporary Committee ‘by one single characteristic which determined everything else: this was their fear of the masses’:
    Oh, how they feared the masses! As I watched our ‘socialists’ speaking to the crowds … I could feel their nauseating fear… I felt the inner trembling, and the effort of will it took not to lower their gaze before the trusting, wide-open eyes of the workers and soldiers crowded around them. AS RECENTLY AS YESTERDAY IT HAD BEEN RELATIVELY EASY TO BE ‘REPRESENTATIVES AND LEADERS’ OF THESE WORKING MASSES; PEACEABLE PARLIAMENTARY SOCIALISTS COULD STILL UTTER THE MOST BLOODCURDLING WORDS ‘IN THE NAME OF THE PROLETARIAT’ WITHOUT EVEN BLINKING. IT BECAME A DIFFERENT STORY, HOWEVER, WHEN THIS THEORETICAL PROLETARIAT SUDDENLY APPEARED HERE, IN THE FULL POWER OF EXHAUSTED FLESH AND MUTINOUS BLOOD. AND WHEN THE TRULY ELEMENTAL NATURE OF THIS FORCE, SO CAPABLE OF EITHER CREATION OR DESTRUCTION, BECAME TANGIBLE TO EVEN THE MOST INSENSITIVE OBSERVER – THEN, ALMOST INVOLUNTARILY, THE PALE LIPS OF THE LEADERS’ BEGAN TO UTTER WORDS OF PEACE AND COMPROMISE IN PLACE OF YESTERDAY’S HARANGUES. They were scared – and who could blame them?38
    Who indeed? And yet this fear was also symptomatic of a general cowardice when it came to the responsibilities of power. It was an abdication of statesmanship. Years later Tsereteli said that the Soviet leaders in February had been childish and irresponsible. Many of them welcomed the dual power system – the source of Russia’s chronic political weaknesses in 1917 – because it placed them in a good position. They were given power without responsibility; while the Provisional Government had responsibility without power.
    For the majority of the Soviet leaders there was a special factor making the negotiation of a Duma government a matter of the utmost urgency. ON 1 MARCH THE LEFT-WING MINORITY OF THE SOVIET EXECUTIVE (3 BOLSHEVIKS, 2 LEFT SRS AND 1 MEMBER OF THE INTER-DISTRICT GROUP) DEMANDED THE FORMATION OF A ‘PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT’ BASED ON THE SOVIETS. THIS RESOLUTION WAS SUPPORTED BY THE BOLSHEVIK COMMITTEE IN THE VYBORG DISTRICT, THE MOST PROLETARIAN IN PETROGRAD. THERE WAS THUS A REAL THREAT THAT, UNLESS THE SOVIET MAJORITY IMPOSED A GOVERNMENT ON THE DUMA LEADERS, THE STREETS MIGHT IMPOSE A GOVERNMENT ON THEM.

    […]

    WHILE THE SOVIET LEADERS WANTED TO RESTORE ORDER, MOST OF THEM HAD NO INTENTION OF ASSUMING POWER. THE WHOLE BASIS OF THEIR STRATEGY WAS TO PRESSURIZE THE DUMA LEADERS INTO FORMING A ‘BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT’. Thus there arose what Trotsky later called the ‘paradox’ of February: that A REVOLUTION MADE IN THE STREETS RESULTED IN A GOVERNMENT MADE IN THE SALONS. This was a recurring pattern throughout the politics of 1917: THERE WERE SEVERAL MOMENTS (FEBRUARY, APRIL, JULY AND SEPTEMBER) WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERS MIGHT HAVE TAKEN POWER, WHEN INDEED THE CROWDS CAME OUT ON TO THE STREETS WITH THE EXPRESS DEMAND THAT THEY DO JUST THAT, BUT ON EACH OCCASION THEY SHIED AWAY FROM THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THIS WAY THEY MISSED THEIR CHANCE TO RESOLVE THE REVOLUTION IN A DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST FORM. THE BOLSHEVIKS REAPED THE BENEFITS.
    How are we to explain this political failure? In the context of February, which determined much of the later politics, there were three main lines of reasoning.
    First, there was the problem of party dogma. BOTH THE MENSHEVIKS AND THE SRS ADHERED RIGIDLY TO THE BELIEF THAT IN A BACKWARD PEASANT COUNTRY SUCH AS RUSSIA THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A ‘BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION’ (MEANING A LONG PERIOD OF CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY) BEFORE RUSSIAN SOCIETY, AND THE WORKING CLASS IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED FOR THE TRANSITION TO A SOCIALIST ORDER. As Plekhanov had once put it, there was not yet enough proletarian yeast in the peasant dough of Russia to make the cake of socialism. In the case of the Mensheviks this belief in the two-stage revolution derived from Marxist theory; and in the case of the SRs it derived largely from the Mensheviks.

  2. Interesanta completare, multumesc!
    Poate vii si cu niste materiale care sa sustina ce spui, ar fi interesant de citit.

  3. Nu stiu cine e Ilarion Tiu, insa mi-e clar ca e tare ignorant in ale istoriei, in masura in care crede ca in Rusia „sovietele din fabrici” (si unitati militare) erau (sau au aparut de la inceput ca) „bolsevice”, adica (in opinia lui) automat malefice. In realitate s-au nascut mensevice (social-democrate) si au fost unul din instrumentele guvernului provizoriu si ale sovietului de la petersburg, din palatul tauridelor, dinainte de octombrie 1917 (care era un amestec de ad-hoc-isti social-democrati si liberali), intru contracararea incercarilor bolsevicilor de a canaliza nemultumirile continue dupa revolutia din februarie!

    Bolsevicii au preluat tarziu puterea, si „sovietele de fabrica” au virat spre factiunea lui Lenin si ele tarziu, dupa mai bine de juma` de an de existenta absolut decenta, de organizatii cetatenesti, doar ca urmare a incompetentei economice a guvernului provizoriu si a insistentei acestuia de a continua razboiul initiat de tzar si vomat de populatie, fapt care a provocat in campania din iunie un nou dezastru cu alura de carnagiu (s-a soldat cu jumatate de milion de victime).

    Apoi e socant e sa constati ca daca autorul insista asupra implicarii comunistilor in organizarea grevei, el trece sub tacere faptul ca guvernul a chemat armata care a tras in muncitori, masacrând cateva zeci de prapaditi. Textul devine astfel doar propaganda pentru un regim politic, nu articol de istorie.. Ipocrizia care îi sileste pe unii sa admita comunistii numai cand trag in populatie, nu si atunci cand sunt aparatorii drepturilor multimii, e dezgustatoare… Asta induce oamenilor falsa credinta ca represiunea s-a nascut doar o data cu instalarea bolsevicilor in România.

    Pana la urma singurul lucru care merita retinut din acele evenimente e ca orice regim politic este unul potential criminal; tot ce lipseste sa-si realizeze aceasta potentialitate e doar o criza economica serioasa, care sa de ocazia multimii sa chestioneze privilegiile elitelor.

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